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Introduction
A strong effect of interest rates on insurance markets is 
acknowledged by many economists. There is no consensus 
on the nature of the relationship between interest rates and 
the insurance industry performance. Equity, underwriting 
profi tability and supply of insurance all appear to be affected 
by interest rates. Although interest rate changes are system-
atic and affect the entire insurance sector across all lines 
simultaneously, empirical results differ, as well as theoretical 
explanations for such results.
Haley (1993) shows a negative relationship between 
interest rates and underwriting margins for stock property-
liability insurers across an extended period. Grace and 
Hotchkiss (1995) fi nd a positive relationship between a 
combined ratio and interest rates, hence a negative rela-
tionship between underwriting profi ts and interest rates. 
Other research shows mixed results regarding the relation-
ship between the insurer’s profi ts and interest rates (Leng 
and Meier, 2002; Park and Choi, 2011). Mixed results are 
mostly explained by the fact that both assets and liabilities of 
insurers are sensitive to interest rates (Doherty and Garven, 
1995). Therefore, the relationship of equity and profi ts with 
interest rates is determined by the balance between durations 
of assets and liabilities. The problem is further complicated 
by the infl uence of capacity constraints, caused by exog-
enous factors, such as business cycles or systemic shocks to 
the insurance industry.
Interest rates affect assets through the insurer’s invest-
ment portfolio. Low interest rates tend to decrease the supply 
of premiums owing to the fact that portfolios of most property 
and casualty insurers consist largely of various government, 
municipal and high-grade corporate bonds according to NAIC 
(2011), which intrinsically are highly correlated with the key 
interest rate (Merton, 1973). In fact, researchers that investi-
gate the interest rate impact on the insurance industry often 
refer to bond yields as interest rates. Decline in the invest-
ment portfolio yield of insurance companies forces them to 
raise premiums in order to cover expenses. Owing to the 
elasticity of supply for insurance (Gron, 1994), the amount of 
insurance policies sold eventually decreases as well.
Insurer’s liabilities are also subject to duration if the fi rm 
is leveraged. Higher rates, for example, increase the cost of 
capital and reduce net income. Although in most cases dura-
tion of assets exceeds duration of liabilities (Doherty and 
Garven, 1995), therefore there is weakness in such explana-
tion for the negative relationship between interest rates and 
insurers’ fi nancial results.
Alternatively, there is another explanation from a perspec-
tive of fi nancial theory for the negative impact of high inter-
est rates on insurers’ profi tability: the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), modifi ed for the insurance industry (Fair-
ley, 1979; Hill, 1979). Haley (1993), Doherty and Garven 
(1995), and Leng and Meier (2002) use CAPM along with 
other similar insurance pricing models to justify the negative 
relationship between interest rates and the performance of 
the insurance industry. An interest rate in a form of a risk 
free rate is used to discount earnings and obtain an internal 
rate of return. The rise of interest rates reduces the internal 
rate of return; however, it has no effect on accounting profi t 
fi gures, which are used for empirical testing. There is also no 
evident connection between a quantity of premiums supplied 
and interest rates that can be explained by CAPM and the 
other insurance pricing models.
All of the above-mentioned literature studies the impact 
of interest rates on the supply-side, represented by insurers, 
while there is a gap in the demand-side research. Aside from 
the fi nancial sector, production risks in most industries are 
not directly affected by interest rates. However, high inter-
est rates may create certain conditions, under which some 
alternatives to insurance become more appealing, thereby 
decreasing a fi nancial incentive to insure. It may provide 
another theoretical explanation of the negative relationship 
between interest rates and insurance industry performance 
based on the impact of interest rates on the demand-side 
of the insurance market. This hypothesis is thoroughly dis-
cussed in this paper with a focus on the case of agricultural 
producers.
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Methodology
In order to provide suffi cient in-depth analysis of the prob-
lem, observations, data samples and the conceptual framework 
are narrowed down to the specifi cs of the agricultural sector. 
The initial hypothesis is that at some point interest rates should 
be high enough for an agricultural producer to be able to limit 
some of the risk by refraining from usual production activities 
without bearing signifi cant opportunity costs. To the author’s 
knowledge, much of the research about interest rate impacts 
on insurance markets ever since Cummins and Outreville 
(1987) has been done mostly in highly developed countries, 
possibly because of the availability of information. However, 
most of the developed countries historically had relatively low 
interest rates for the past 25 years. All of the research has been 
carried out in a relatively lower margin of the interest rate 
fl uctuations in comparison to global interest rates. In order to 
observe possible negative infl uence of high interest rates on 
decisions to insure, it is proposed to take a look at agricultural 
insurance markets in developing economies.
There are several emerging economies, also large agri-
cultural producers, with constantly high interest rates, which 
have problematic agricultural insurance markets. The initial 
observation is made in Ukraine, one of the world’s top pro-
ducers of sunfl ower seeds and barley. Despite government 
attempts to facilitate agricultural insurance market develop-
ment, it is poor and ineffi cient mostly due to low demand 
for insurance. Meanwhile, the key interest rate in Ukraine 
averages 9 per cent for the past ten years. Further observa-
tions show that Brazil, currently with a key interest rate of 
9.75 per cent (as of March 20121), is known to struggle with 
the implementation of insurance in its massive agricultural 
sector. Most farmers choose not to purchase insurance and, 
as observed by Tueller et al. (2009), bear substantial losses 
owing to such choice, while government support appears 
futile. Another notable example is Argentina, where supply 
of insurance is abundant with 26 companies providing cheap 
hail insurance for nearly half of the cereals and oilseeds pro-
duced, and yet only 5 per cent is covered by a multiple peril 
crop insurance (Miguez, 2010). Implementation of non-hail 
insurance products is still problematic in the country. Hail 
insurance is naturally viable with very low premium rates as it 
avoids two of the major drawbacks of agricultural insurance: 
asymmetry of information and systematic losses (Hertzler, 
2005). Unfortunately, hail insurance only covers a small part 
of the production risks that farmers face. There are numerous 
factors that put pressure on demand for agricultural insur-
ance in developing economies, making it diffi cult to isolate 
the interest rate factor. Among the most important of these 
factors in Ukraine, for instance, are lacking statistical data 
and an ineffi cient law system that makes it diffi cult to settle 
any possible disputes between the insurer and the insured. 
The infl uence of these and other issues on the demand for 
insurance is hard to quantify or control for. While all of the 
factors are interconnected and undoubtedly considered in 
the decision making process, the quantitative measure of the 
interest rate factor can be independently determined under 
the assumption that the farmer is risk neutral and rational.
1 Central Bank of Brazil SELIC interest rates: http://www.bcb.gov.br/?INTEREST.
To adequately compare conditions under which insurers 
operate, we can look at a simple demand function for insur-
ance (ID(p,q)), proposed by Weiss (2007):
 (1)
where p is price, q is quantity, μ
Λ
 is the average of expected 
losses, ι is expected infl ation, E is equity, S is assets,  is the 
variance of expected losses, σ
Λε
 is the covariance between 
expected losses (Λ) and expected income (ε), and O is busi-
ness opportunities (general growth of the economy). Notable 
variables are infl ation and business opportunities. However, 
both are proportional to demand and are high in emerg-
ing economies by defi nition. That is, emerging economies 
expand at a faster pace and provide opportunities for busi-
ness growth, and infl ation accompanies rapid growth. There-
fore, there may be something missing, and to logically come 
up with a missing variable it is worth taking a closer look at 
the overall process of managing production risk in agricul-
ture, specifi cally at alternatives to insurance.
Production risk in agriculture is mainly caused by weather 
patterns, which are unpredictable and stochastic in nature. 
Owing to the natural lag between the allocation of capital 
and the time of harvest, weather conditions are impossible to 
predict with certainty. Unlike price risk, which can be mini-
mised by hedging, production risk (beyond horizontal diver-
sifi cation) can only be insured against, pooled, or limited to 
the point where it can be absorbed by a farm. Risk pooling 
is not suitable for all farm businesses, as it requires a certain 
degree of cooperation based on trust and ethics among mem-
bers. Risk pooling is obviously a preferred method, since 
it does not have any associated costs except loss costs, and 
it is fair to assume that, if it is among options, farm busi-
nesses already use it. Farmers that do not pool risks have two 
options: to purchase an insurance policy and eliminate some 
or all of the risk, or limit the risk by diversifi cation (other 
than horizontal) and absorb it. ‘Wright and Hewitt (1994) 
suggest that the perceived demand for agricultural insurance 
may be overstated, because farmers can use diversifi cation 
and savings to cushion the impact of production shortfalls on 
consumption’ (Mahul and Stutley, 2010, p.23).
A common opinion is that a decision to insure is mostly 
determined by an individual preference towards risk (Hojjati 
and Bockstael, 1988; Coble et al., 1996; Guiso and Jappelli, 
1998). This may be relevant for some small family farms to 
a certain extent, but risk aversion is hardly a determinant in 
decisions to insure by medium to large agribusinesses and 
corporate entities, as noted by Mayers and Smith (1982). 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) originally stated 
that it is pointless to measure risk preference for entities that 
operate in terms of costs and profi ts. Therefore the following 
research is set in a framework of fi nancially motivated deci-
sions that are defi ned by the rules of fi nancial theory.
Defi nition of choices
There are many choices that agricultural producers face 
when it comes to insurance. Hojjati and Bockstael (1988) 
show that a farmer can choose between insurance plans as 
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well as crops to plant, which crop to insure, and to what 
extent, thereby facing a countless variety of choices. Select-
ing an appropriate insurance plan by itself is a complicated 
process that makes choice analysis quite diffi cult (Ginder et 
al., 2009). Crop rotation and other technical factors further 
sophisticate decision making. Clearly, on a macroeconomic 
level, given territorial differences, the approach that would 
consider even simplifi ed versions of all important choices 
is hard to apply. In this paper choices are limited to two 
ultimate options: to insure or not to insure. It implies that 
when an agricultural producer considers insurance, it is the 
optimal insurance solution that is available along with an 
optimal production portfolio. In this way the theory has few 
constraints and can be applied to any area and any country.
Let the decision to insure be choice A, and the decision 
to limit and absorb risk be choice B. Choice A leads to cash 
fl ows CAn, where n is a number of a cash fl ow. A net future 
value of cash fl ows ΣCAn is CA. Choice B leads to cash fl ows 
CBn with the net future value CB. If an agricultural producer 
has no personal risk preference or is risk-neutral, then the 
decision to insure (A) is determined by equation (2):
 (2)
Let us closer examine cash fl ows from choice A:
CA = –π + φ
φ = l × x (3)
where π is the future value of the insurance premium and φ 
is an indemnity payment (l) multiplied by its probability to 
occur (x), assuming, for simplicity’s sake, that 100% of the 
loss from a risk event is indemnifi ed.
The premium for a property and casualty insurance gen-
erally consists of loss expenses (Le), profi t of the insurer 
(RI), and administrative and operating expenses (Oe). Also 
return on the insurer’s investment portfolio in currency form 
(II) and government subsidies (G) are subtracted from the 
premium, because they are positive cash fl ows from a point 
of view of an insured. The future value of cash fl ows from 
choice A with a disaggregate premium looks as follows:
 (4)
It is easy to approximate the amount of the insurer’s 
profi t in a premium using equation (5). The ratio of equity 
(or surplus) (TE) to premiums (TP) can be calculated from 
data available in fi nancial statements of the insurer along 
with the insurer’s return on equity (RoIE):
 (5)
where P is the amount of insurance premium, TE is the 
insurer’s total equity, TP is the total amount of premiums, 
which the insurer collects in a year, RoIE is a rate of return 
on the insurer’s equity. Note that all returns on equity in this 
research are calculated using current local currency units; 
therefore, there is no need for infl ation adjustments.
 (6)
where ri is a rate of return on the insurer’s investment port-
folio.
Equation (4) represents the future value of cash fl ows 
of choice A with two variables discounted by two different 
factors. It is important to discount cash fl ows separately, 
because one of the discounting factors has an evident high 
correlation with interest rates, while the other does not. The 
importance of this correlation will be demonstrated later on. 
Both discounted variables (equations 5 and 6) are approxi-
mated for simplifi cation. Return on the insurer’s investment 
portfolio and profi t per a specifi c amount of premium can 
only be determined by the insurer using detailed informa-
tion that is usually not disclosed in accounting statements. 
Discounting factors throughout this paper are assumed to 
be in a form that incorporates all of the time specifi cations 
and the frequency of compounding for simplicity’s sake. For 
instance, ri and other discounting factors in this paper can be 
calculated using a nominal interest rate (z) and a number of 
compounding periods (t) as follows:
For more complicated cases of discounting refer to Jor-
ion (2009).
The alternative to insurance is the second choice B: not 
to insure or to limit and absorb risk. Whenever any produc-
tion is intentionally limited, a certain amount of capital is 
turned into cash or fi nancial assets and acts as a reserve (R) 
or is used to reduce debt. In agricultural production any type 
of a liquid asset can act as a reserve with a purpose of self-
insurance (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986), yet cash and 
short-term fi nancial assets are clearly preferred in a major-
ity of scenarios and are analysed in this research. Although 
we do not have comprehensive information on savings rates 
among agricultural producers in developing countries, there 
are supporting data that farmers in developed countries rely 
on savings to smoothen fi nancial consequences of the yield 
variability. A study of farmers in the Australian Mallee indi-
cates that almost all farmers build reserves or reduce debt in 
good years in an effort to reduce the magnitude and impact 
of income variability (Wright and Hewitt, 1994). At the same 
time as the reserve is formed, opportunity costs (Co) occur 
owing to reduced operating income. If a farm chooses to 
limit and absorb risk, fi nancial consequences of such deci-
sion are demonstrated by the following formula:
 (7)
where Co is the opportunity cost, YR is the yield of the 
reserved capital, and γ represents additional losses, caused 
by a sharp decline in revenue owing to a risk event.
The opportunity (Co) cost can be defi ned as a product of 
a rate of return on the farm’s equity (RoFE) and the amount 
of the reserved capital (R):
 (8)
The yield of the reserved capital (YR) is represented as a 
product of a rate of return on the reserved capital (yr) and the 
size of the reserve (R):
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Note that the loss from a risk event itself is not included 
as a negative cash fl ow for choice B, simply because it does 
not exist in such form for a farm that is profi table in the long 
term. Such a variable would be a part of an average income 
from agricultural production, hence it is superfl uous.
Intuition behind γ is a sum of negative fi nancial conse-
quences which an agricultural producer faces by experienc-
ing a large loss at once, rather than it being averaged across 
an extended period:
 (10)
where σ is a quantitative measure of production and/or price 
risk, ω is a level of diversifi cation, LF is a measure of fi nan-
cial leverage, LO is a measure of operating leverage. σ is 
not necessarily volatility, it can be a more comprehensive 
measure of risk (e.g. probability distribution function, value-
at-risk).
In other words, γ is a residual between all losses that a 
risk event causes and the expected loss over time, which can 
be described as φ (equation 3). Thereby, when a farm experi-
ences a risk event with a loss (l), it also suffers additional to 
φ losses, determined by γ. The primary reason behind insur-
ance is to eliminate γ by swapping l for φ for a price of π.
Equation (7) is set up in a way for the following to be 
true:
 (11)
where b represents the relationship between R and γ as well 
as YR and γ, and a is a level of R, at which γ is deemed insig-
nifi cant. The linear inverse relationship here suggests that for 
the value of the function γ to decrease, more cash must be 
reserved by limiting production. More opportunity costs (Co) 
will occur and the yield on the reserved capital will increase 
(YR). The opposite should also be true. If a farm does not use 
any debt, has few fi xed costs, and the revenue cash fl ows 
are highly diversifi ed, then γ should be insignifi cant. The 
reserved capital (R) directly reduces γ and also produces a 
diversifi ed cash fl ow (YR) with no correlation to income from 
agricultural production.
If a farm business is leveraged, choice B becomes even 
more appealing with higher interest rates (lending rates in 
this case). Instead of reserving capital, a farm uses cash 
to pay out debt and limits production in exactly the same 
way (equation 7). Decline in the cost of debt in currency 
form (CD) replaces increment in the yield on the reserved 
capital (YR). For instance, consider , where D is debt, 
E is equity, and E ≠ 0. If LF > 0, then CB = – Co – CD – γ, where 
CD = –D × rD. The cost of debt (rD) should always be greater 
than the rate of return on the reserved capital (yr) for the 
same time setting: rD > yr. This is simply because capital, 
lent to any farm business, holds more risk than a nearly risk-
free fi nancial asset (e.g. a deposit certifi cate) and therefore 
requires an additional risk premium. The case of a leveraged 
farm business is described in detail in Appendix A.
Comparing the choices
The choice to insure (A) and the choice not to insure or 
to limit and absorb risk (B), as mentioned earlier, are deter-
mined by equation (2). It can also be written alternatively as 
a function ΔC to allow continuity:
 (12)
Positive values of ΔC indicate that insurance is fi nan-
cially viable, while negative ΔC shows the opposite. ΔC can 
be viewed as a quantitative measure of the fi nancial incen-
tive to insure. If we substitute formulas for CA and CB from 
equations (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) into equation (12), the result 
will be as follows:
 (13)
For further analysis it is necessary to eliminate similar 
variables by several assumptions and isolate interest rate 
correlated variables. Once interest rate related factors are 
defi ned, the assumptions can be then relaxed if needed. It can 
be set that the loss expenses (Le) are equal to the indemnity φ 
(equation 3). If Le = φ, then:
Consider a scenario, where an agricultural producer 
chooses to limit agricultural production and instead store 
freed up capital in nearly riskless fi nancial assets to achieve a 
level of income diversifi cation, at which γ becomes insignifi -
cant and equals to zero. This is ultimately choice B, which 
opposes insurance. It is an equivalent of a combination of 
what was originally defi ned as a self-protection and self-
insurance by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). If , then 
γ = 0; if γ = 0, then:
 (14)
Interest rate sensitivity
Equation (14) consists of four terms, two of which can be 
highly correlated with the key interest rate, and the other two 
have no clear correlation. The return on the insurer’s equity 
(equation 5) and the farm’s opportunity costs (Co) or the 
return on the farm’s equity are determined by market condi-
tions that incorporate multiple factors and have no evident 
consistent connection to interest rates2. The return on the 
insurer’s investment portfolio, which is roughly estimated 
by equation (6), and the yield of the reserved capital (YR) are 
basically determined by interest rates.
It is appropriate to use a specifi c interest rate if the cor-
relation with the key interest rate is too low to achieve a 
2 Return on the insurer’s equity cannot be adequately represented in any correlation 
with interest rates, although logically some positive correlation may exist. Venezian 
(2002) states that in order to relate insurer’s returns to interest rates a complex model 
must be built that is beyond verifi cation owing to the amount of data needed.
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desired level of accuracy. Otherwise the key interest rate can 
be used to calculate ri and yr with an adjustment for their 
historical ratio as follows:
where r is the key interest rate set by the central bank of a 
country, μ is the average value represented by the arithmetic 
mean, rin is the rate of return on the insurer’s investment port-
folio or the bond yield in this particular case at time n, rn is the 
key interest rate at time n, and yrn is the rate of return on the 
reserved capital or the yield of deposit certifi cates at time n.
The fi nancial incentive to insure can be written as a func-
tion of the key interest rate r:
 (15)
If ΔC is calculated for a particular crop and a risk event 
with a known size of casualty and the probability to occur, 
then the fi nancial incentive to insure can be computed with 
equation (15). A graph of the function f(r) on Figure 1 dem-
onstrates the linear relationship between interest rate changes 
and the fi nancial incentive to insure (ΔC).
The slope of f(r), however, also depends on the values 
of the premium (P) and the reserved capital (R), which 
can change across different crops and levels of risk. The slope 
of f(r) may change at a rate that is determined by a ratio of 
yields that the insurer and the farm business get on their capital 
(P and R respectively) to the key interest rate (see Appendix 
B for a mathematical explanation). The change of the fi nan-
cial incentive to insure (ΔC) caused by varying P depends 
on , and the change owing to varying R is deter-
mined by . An important implication of this is that a 
moderate increase in R tends to amplify either a positive or 
a negative value of ΔC without changing its sign. A large 
increase in R, as in presence of catastrophic risk, may, how-
ever, shift ΔC into a positive value (owing to the relationship 
in equation 11) and favour the decision to insure. The main 
purpose of this research, however, is to establish the impact 
of the key interest rate on decisions to insure using the fi nan-
cial incentive to insure (ΔC or f(r)).
Results
We apply the proposed technique to agricultural insur-
ance markets of Ukraine and the United States. Input param-
eters and the fi nancial incentive to insure, shown in Table 1, 
demonstrate differences between agricultural insurance mar-
kets of the developing and developed economies.
Logically, insurance should not be viable if ΔC is sig-
nifi cantly negative in a medium to long term, unless there 
are factors, aside from ΔC components, that outweigh the 
negative impact. Empirical study shows that in the develop-
ing economy of Ukraine the fi nancial incentive to insure is at 
the average of -0.18 per 1 LCU of producer premium, while 
in the United States it is at USD 1.15 per USD 1 of premium 
(Table 1). The measure is so high in the United States mainly 
owing to abundant government subsidies and low interest 
rates. Notably, the returns on insurers’ equity among seven 
insurance companies that share 91 per cent of the agricul-
tural insurance market in Ukraine is below the rate of infl a-
tion, key interest rate, and lower than the rate of return of the 
United States insurance companies for the years 2002-2011. 
Insurance companies in Ukraine also take more risk by low-
ering the TE/TP ratio. This demonstrates possible relation-
ships between ΔC components and demand for insurance, 
which can be useful to insurers seeking to implement new 
products in emerging economies with high interest rates.
Discussion
This research provides a method for evaluating agricultural 
insurance decisions from a fi nancial perspective. The choice 
to insure opposes the choice to limit and absorb risk, and each 
choice has fi nancial consequences for a farm business, repre-
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Figure 1: The relationship between interest rates and the fi nancial 
incentive to insure.
Table 1: Input parameters and the fi nancial incentive to insure for 
agricultural producers of Ukraine and Kansas farms of the United 
States, 2002-2011.
Parameter Ukraine Kansas state of the United States
Interest rates (%)*
Average 14.4 2.1
Standard deviation 3.2 1.7
Return on farmers’ equity (%)
Average 13.0 1.1
Standard deviation 7.0 1.6
Return on insurers’ equity (%)
Average 5.8 7.1
Standard deviation 5.0 4.1
Ratio of total equity to total premiums of insurers
Average 0.63 1.09
Standard deviation 0.26 0.30
ΔC (LCU)**
Average -0.18 1.15
Standard deviation 0.43 0.34
* Yields on three month deposit certifi cates for Ukraine and one year treasuries for the 
United States.
** The fi nancial incentive to insure in local currency units (LCU) per one LCU of 
premium paid by the farmer.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the USDA RMA data, the Federal Reserve data, 
Insurance Services Offi ce data, and fi nancial statements of insurers. The raw data are 
available from the author upon request.
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Appendix A
The case of a leveraged enterprise
A leveraged agricultural producer has an option to reduce 
risk by lowering or eliminating fi nancial leverage. If avail-
able, this option is preferred over reserving funds because 
it is cheaper by defi nition, as the cost of debt incorporates 
the risk premium: rD = rf + rp (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2011), 
while yr ≈ rf, where rf is a risk free rate and rp is a risk pre-
mium. In this case:
 (A.1)
 (A.2)
where CD is the cost of debt in currency form, and D is the 
amount of debt that is liquidated in order to reduce risk. The 
direct relationship  in equation (A.1) remains accu-
rate and determines the amount of D. Note that in function 
γ (equation 10) decline in D reduces LF, while in the case of 
an unleveraged farm business rising R reduces the impact 
of income variability and YR increases ω. In both cases γ is 
reduced. When γ = 0,
 (A.3)
Return on equity should be similar to return on debt 
according to Modigliani and Miller (1958). Return on equity 
in equation (A.3) can be replaced with return on debt for 
a higher precision if enough information is available for its 
calculation. The fi nancial incentive to insure for a leveraged 
farm is calculated as follows:
 (A.4)
If a tax shield is applicable, then 
 (A.5)
where τ is the tax rate.
If debt is fully eliminated (LF = 0 in equation 10), yet γ 
(equation 10) is not decreased to an acceptable level, then R 
needs to increase to reduce γ further:
 (A.6)
 (A.7)
The cost of debt (rD) that is closely correlated to the key 
interest rate r can be alternatively calculated as .
Appendix B
If the amount of premium (P) and the reserved capital 
(R) vary along with interest rates, the fi nancial incentive to 
insure is:
where TE, TP, RoIE, RoFE, Oe , and G are held constant.
Therefore the rate of change of the fi nancial incentive to 
insure ultimately depends on yields, at which both the insurer 
and the farm business are able to store their fi nancial assets.
